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We explore the short-run and long-run effects on fertility of inequality with regard to human
capital when the individual's fertility decision is influenced by average fertility in the
economy. We find simple conditions under which a mean-preserving spread in the
distribution of human capital helps decrease fertility and increase future average human
capital.
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The literature on the e®ects of inequality on fertility has assumed that there is no social
norm that in°uences fertility decisions. On the contrary, existing theoretical work on the
relationship between social norms and fertility assumes homogeneous individuals in terms
of human capital. The objective of this paper is to explore the e®ects on the average levels
of fertility and human capital of inequality in human capital when an individual's fertility
decision is in°uenced by social norms, namely, average fertility rates in an economy.
There exists much empirical evidence on the important role that fertility behavior of
one's cohorts plays in fertility decisions. For example, based on two sets of research studies
that cover most developing countries, namely, the World Fertility Survey and the Prince-
ton European Fertility Project, Coale and Watkins (Eds.)(1986) and Cleland and Hobcraft
(Eds.)(1985) ¯nd that region and culture are important in determining fertility levels. In
addition, Freedman et al. (1965) indicate that social norms about family size control fertility
behavior of American couples. Moreover, Montgomery and Chung (1999), Rosero-Bixby and
Casterline (1994), and Montgomery and Casterline (1993) provide statistical evidence on the
contribution of social interaction to fertility in Republic of Korea, Costa Rica and Taiwan,
respectively.1 However, theoretical investigation on how the existence of social norms a®ects
fertility has been scattered. A few exceptions include Munshi and Myaux (2006), Palivos
(2001), and Crook (1978), but the relationship between inequality in terms of human capital
and fertility is not considered.
This paper is also related to those that explore the relationship between inequality and
fertility. Galor and Zang (1997) investigate the impact of inequality on fertility, human
capital and growth under borrowing constraints. Morand (1999) has a model of inequality
and fertility in which fertility decisions are motivated by old-age support. Croix and Doepke
(2003) have a model of inequality and growth in which fertility and education decisions
depend on, among other things, the level of one's human capital. Moav (2005) presents
a model of fertility and child educational choice, which explains the persistence of poverty
trap. Social norms, however, are not considered in their models.
In the following section, we introduce the model. Section 3 presents results on the short-




Consider overlapping generations of individuals who live for two periods: youth and old
age. Each individual is endowed with one unit of time per period. We follow Palivos (2001)
in that, when young, the individual decides how much time to devote to her own education,
and how much to raising children. When old, the individual works full-time regardless of
wages, and her consumption depends on the level of human capital:
ct+1 = wt+1ht+1; (1)
1For more evidence, see Palivos (2001).
1where wt+1 is a wage rate in period t + 1 and ht+1 is the level of human capital when old,
the latter depending on the amount of education attained when young.
If the individual in period t spends et 2 [0;1] on education, her human capital in the
next period is given by
ht+1 = B(µ + etht)
°; (2)
where ht is the level of human capital of the individual's parent, and B;µ > 0 and ° 2 (0;1)
are constant parameters. The parameter µ captures the level of human capital when no
education was attained when young.
Given et, the remainder of the time endowment is spent on raising children. We assume
that raising one child takes 1=± hours. Thus the number of children, or the fertility rate, nt,
is given by
nt = ±(1 ¡ et) (3)
The utility function of an individual born at time t is of the form
Ut = u(nt; ¹ nt) + ¯ lnct+1; (4)
where u is utility from having children and ¹ nt denotes the average fertility rate in period
t. Thus the individual's utility depends not only on the number of her own children but
also on the average fertility behavior of the other individuals in the economy. We assume
u1 ´ @u=@nt > 0, u2 ´ @u=@¹ nt > 0, u11 ´ @2u=@n2
t · 0 and u12 ´ @2u=@¹ nt@nt ¸ 0. Given
¹ nt, the individual in period t maximizes (4) subject to (1), (2) and (3).
The production of a representative ¯rm exhibits constant returns to scale:
yt+1 = Aht+1; (5)
where A > 0 is a parameter.
Human capital is distributed between hmin
t and hmax
t according to the distribution func-















ntI(ht+1 · h) dF(ht); (7)








An equilibrium for the economy is de¯ned as follows:
2De¯nition: Given an initial distribution of human capital F0(h0) and an initial population









t=0 such that (i) each individual's utility
function is maximized, (ii) total population evolves according to (6), (iii) the distribution
of human capital evolves according to (7), (iv) the labor market clears, i.e., wt+1 = A holds,
(v) the goods market clears, i.e., yt+1 = ct+1 holds, and (vi) the expectation of ¹ nt coincides






nt(ht; ¹ nt) dF(ht) (9)
We restrict attention to stable equilibria, wherein the derivative of the right-hand side of (9)
with respect to ¹ nt evaluated at an equilibrium fertility rate is strictly less than 1. In Figure
1, the right-hand side of (9) as the function of ¹ nt is denoted by RHS(¹ nt). ¹ n¤
t;1 and ¹ n¤
t;3 are
stable while ¹ n¤
t;2 is not.2 Note that, if an equilibrium is stable, a slight downward shift of
RHS induces a lower equilibrium fertility rate.
By the ¯rst-order condition, et(ht; ¹ nt) is determined by3




if ht · ht · ¹ ht, where ht and ¹ ht are respectively determined by





±u1(0; ¹ nt) =
¯°¹ ht
µ + ¹ ht
(12)
Otherwise,
et(ht; ¹ nt) =
½
0 if hmin
t · ht · ht
1 if ¹ ht · ht · hmax
t
(13)
It should be noted that both ht and ¹ ht are increasing in ¹ nt.






t ¡ ±2u11(±(1 ¡ et); ¹ nt)(µ + ehht)2 > 0 (14)
Thus investment in human capital increases as the parent's human capital increases. Also,




2The occurance of multiple equilibria is not our focus. Palivos (2001) investigates issues related to multiple
equilibria in the case of homogeneous individuals.
3The second-order condition for a maximum is satis¯ed.
3which means that education decreases as the expectation of the average fertility rate in the
economy increases.
From (3) and et(ht; ¹ nt) obtained above, fertility rate is given by





t · ht · ht
±(1 ¡ et(ht; ¹ nt)) if ht · ht · ¹ ht
0 if ¹ ht · ht · hmax
t
(16)
In contrast to education, from (3) and (14), we ¯nd that fertility rate falls as the parent's




From (2) and et(ht; ¹ nt), human capital in period t + 1 is given by





t · ht · ht
B(µ + et(ht; ¹ nt)ht)° if ht · ht · ¹ ht
B(µ + ht)° if ¹ ht · ht · hmax
t
; (18)
which is depicted in Figure 2. Note that ht+1 does not depend on ¹ nt for ht · ht and ht ¸ ¹ ht,
where ht and ¹ ht are the functions of ¹ nt.






every individual does not invest in human capital at all and has ± children. Second, if all ht






to hold, every individual devotes the whole time endowment to education and has no child.
In what follows, we consider the case where hmin
t < ht < ¹ ht < hmax
t hold.
3. DISTRIBUTIONAL SHIFTS AND FERTILITY
In this section, we explore how the equilibrium fertility rate changes as the distribution of
human capital changes. We ¯rst study the short-run e®ects. An investigation of the long-run
e®ects follows.
3.1 Short-run E®ects
Let us begin with the impact on fertility rates of ¯rst-order stochastically dominating
shifts in ht. With this kind of shifts, all individuals' human capital increases. We have the
following result, as is to be expected:
Proposition 1. With ¯rst-order stochastically dominating shifts in the distribution of
human capital in period t, the equilibrium average fertility rate (in period t) falls and the
average human capital (in period t + 1) rises.
Proof: See Appendix.
4The e®ect of inequality on fertility is less obvious. Let us ¯rst consider the case of a
uniform distribution. In this case, we have the following result:
Proposition 2. Suppose ht is distributed uniformly along [m ¡ k;m + k], where m is the
(¯xed) average level of human capital and k 2 (0;m] is a parameter describing the extent of
inequality. Then as k increases,
(i) the equilibrium fertility rate falls if ¹ nt > ±=2,
(ii) the equilibrium fertility rate rises if ¹ nt < ±=2.





±[ht(¹ nt(k)) ¡ (m ¡ k)] +
Z ¹ ht(¹ nt(k))
ht(¹ nt(k))
nt(ht; ¹ nt) dht
¾
(19)

































the denominator of (20) is positive. Therefore we have the result. ¤
The above result states that if fertility is already high in the ¯rst place, a more unequal
distribution helps decrease average fertility.
The intuition behind this is as follows. Suppose for a moment that the (equilibrium)
expectation of ¹ nt is unchanged. As k increases, the value of the density function f(ht;k) =




ht nt(ht; ¹ nt) dht, decreases. Next, from ¹ nt > ±=2, ht must satisfy
Z ¹ ht
ht
nt(ht; ¹ nt) dht > ±(m ¡ ht) (21)
If ht > m, the average fertility rate of the individuals with ht 2 [m ¡ k;ht], which is
Ft(ht;k) = ±
2k[ht ¡ (m ¡ k)], also decreases, because @Ft=@k < 0 for ht > m. Thus the
average fertility rate of the economy falls. On the other hand, if ht · m, the average
fertility rate of the individuals with ht 2 [m ¡ k;ht] changes by ±
2k2(m ¡ ht) while that of
the individuals with ht 2 [ht;¹ ht] changes by ¡ 1
2k2
R ¹ ht
ht nt(ht; ¹ nt) dht. Although the former
is positive, from (21), the total change is negative. Thus, in any case, fertility decreases
with an increase in k, with the expectation of ¹ nt held constant. As fertility declines, the
right-hand side of (19) shifts downwards, which leads to a lower equilibrium fertility rate.
Therefore, an increase in the extent of inequality helps decrease the average fertility rate of
the economy if ¹ nt > ±=2.
In the case of a general distribution function, we have the following results:
Proposition 3. Let F(ht;k) be the distribution function of human capital, where k is a
mean-preserving spread parameter. That is, if k0 > k, F(ht;k0) is a mean-preserving spread
of F(ht;k). Then as k increases,
5(i) the average fertility rate falls if @F(ht;k)=@k < 0 for ht 2 (ht;¹ ht),
(ii) the average fertility rate rises if @F(ht;k)=@k > 0 for ht 2 (ht;¹ ht).
Proof: Follows directly from (A-3) by letting s = k.
Thus distributional shifts only in ht 2 (ht;¹ ht) a®ect fertility.
3.2 Long-run E®ects
Next, we analyze the long-run e®ects of inequality on fertility and the average level of
human capital.
Let us ¯rst consider the case where the 45-degree line crosses ht+1 = ht+1(ht; ¹ nt) once
(from below). The following three cases could occur:
Case 1:
Suppose that there exists t0 such that the following conditions hold for 8t ¸ t0: (i) the 45-
degree line crosses ht+1 = ht+1(ht; ¹ nt) at some ht 2 [minfhmin
t ;Bµ°g;ht], (ii) ht+1(ht) < ht+1,
and (iii) ht+1(¹ ht) < ¹ ht+1 (Figure 3). Then all individuals' human capital converges to
h¤ = Bµ°, and the (average) fertility rate in this steady state is n¤ = ±.
Case 2:
Suppose that there exists t0 such that the following conditions hold for 8t ¸ t0: (i) the
45-degree line crosses ht+1 = ht+1(ht; ¹ nt) at some ht ¸ ¹ ht, (ii) ht+1(ht) > ht+1, and (iii)
ht+1(¹ ht) > ¹ ht+1. Then all individuals' human capital converges to h¤, which is determined
by B(µ + h¤)° = h¤. The fertility rate in this case is n¤ = 0.
Case 3:
Suppose that there exists n¤ such that ¹ nt converges to n¤, and that there exists t0 such
that the following conditions hold for 8t ¸ t0: (i) the 45-degree line crosses ht+1 at some
ht 2 [ht;¹ ht], (ii) ht+1(ht) > ht+1, and (iii) ht+1(¹ ht) < ¹ ht+1. Then h¤ and n¤ are determined
by B(µ + et(h¤;n¤)h¤)° = h¤ and n¤ = ±(1 ¡ et(h¤;n¤)).
Note that in cases 1 and 2, as long as the conditions are satis¯ed, changes in the distri-
bution of human capital do not a®ect the average levels of fertility and human capital.
In order to see clearly that there exists a case in which inequality a®ects fertility and
human capital, let us consider the following case:
Case 4:
Suppose that there exists t0 such that ¹ nt = n¤ for 8t ¸ t0, and that the 45-degree
line crosses ht+1 = ht+1(ht; ¹ nt) three times at h¤
1 2 [Bµ°;h(n¤)], h¤
2 2 (h(n¤);¹ h(n¤)) and
h¤





6Thus if @Ft0(ht0;k)=@k > 0 (respectively, @Ft0(ht0;k)=@k < 0) for ht0 2 (h(n¤);¹ h(n¤)), the
fertility rate rises (respectively, falls), which means that Proposition 3 holds true in the
long-run too.











Therefore if @Ft0(ht0;k)=@k > 0 (@Ft0(ht0;k)=@k < 0) for ht0 2 (h(n¤);¹ h(n¤)), the average
human capital decreases (increases).
Suppose a mean-preserving spread is such that @Ft0(ht0;k)=@k > 0 for ht0 < ^ h¤ and
@Ft0(ht0;k)=@k < 0 for ht0 > ^ h¤, as in the case of a uniform distribution. Then it is seen that
average human capital decreases if h¤
2 < ^ h¤, increases if h¤
2 > ^ h¤.
The other cases can be analyzed in a similar way.
4. CONCLUSION
When the individual's fertility decision is in°uenced not only by economic incentives but
also by fertility behavior of her cohorts, how do the average levels of fertility and human
capital change if the inequality of human capital changes? We ¯nd that, in the short-run,
if fertility is already high in the ¯rst place in the case of a uniform distribution, an increase
in inequality helps reduce fertility. In the case of a general distribution, we show that
distributional shifts only in a certain range a®ect average fertility rates. More precisely, if the
distribution function shifts downwards (upwards) for the levels of human capital with which
individuals have a positive, but smaller than the maximum, number of children, average
fertility falls (rises). We ¯nd that there exists a case wherein the same result holds in the
long-run. In such a case, when fertility falls (rises), the average level of human capital in a
steady state rises (falls). We also ¯nd that, in the long-run, there exist cases in which the
limiting distribution is degenerate and so changes in inequality do not a®ect fertility and
human capital.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
From (9) and (16), an equilibrium average fertility rate is determined by
¹ nt(s) = ±F(ht(¹ nt(s));s) +
Z ¹ ht(¹ nt(s))
ht(¹ nt(s))
nt(ht; ¹ nt(s)) dF(ht;s); (A-1)
where F(ht;s) satis¯es @F=@s · 0 for 8 ht. Thus F with a larger s ¯rst-order stochastically
dominates those with smaller s.
































@¹ nt f(ht;s) < 1
















From @nt=@ht < 0 for ht 2 (ht;¹ ht) and @F=@s · 0, we have @¹ nt=@s · 0.
Next, from (8) and (18), the average human capital in period t + 1 is given by




ht+1(ht; ¹ nt) dF(ht;s); (A-4)
where hmax is large enough for F(hmax;s) = 1 to be satis¯ed for 8s. So @F(hmax;s)=@s = 0.


















From (15) and (18), @ht+1=@¹ nt is negative. Besides, @ht+1=@ht is positive. Therefore, we
have @^ ht+1=@s ¸ 0.
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